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Abstract: With greater availability of data and increasing interaction activities taking 
place on social media, to detect overlapping and hierarchical communities has become 
an important issue and one that is essential to social media analysis. In this paper, we 
propose a coalition formation game theory-based approach to identify overlapping 
and hierarchical communities. We model community detection as a coalition 
formation game in which individuals in a social network are modelled as rational 
players aiming to improve the group’s utilities by cooperating with other players to 
form coalitions. Each player is allowed to join multiple coalitions, and those 
coalitions with fewer players can merge into a larger coalition as long as the merge 
operation is beneficial to the utilities of the merged coalitions, thus overlapping and 
hierarchical communities can be revealed simultaneously. The utility function of each 
coalition is defined as the combination of a gain function and a cost function. The 
gain function measures the degree of interactions amongst the players inside a 
coalition, while the cost function instead represents the degree of the interactions 
between the players of the coalition and the rest of the network. As game theory 
provides a formal analytical framework with a set of mathematical tools to study the 
complex interactions among rational players, to apply game theory for detecting 
communities helps to identify communities more rationally. Some desirable properties 
of the utility function, such as the non-resolution limit and the non-scaling behaviour, 
have been examined theoretically. To solve the issue of pre-setting the number and 
size for communities and to improve the efficiency of the detection process, we have 
developed a greedy agglomerative manner to identify communities. Extensive 
experiments have been conducted on synthetic and real networks to evaluate the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed approach.  
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1 Introduction 
With social networks gaining in popularity, social network analysis has become an 
important research issue, with a significant impact on society (Fortunato 2010; Li et al. 
2014). One major and fundamental topic in social network analysis is community 
detection, i.e. to identify groups of vertices in a network such that the vertices within a 
group are much more connected to each other than to the rest of the network 
(Newman and Girvan 2004; Fortunato 2010). Because individuals belonging to the 
same community are more likely to have common features, such as social functions, 
interests on some topics, viewpoints, etc. (Zhao et al. 2012), the identified 
communities can be used in the improvement of services (Krishnamurthy and Wang 
2000), knowledge sharing (Liu et al. 2010), collaborative recommendation (Yuan et al. 
2010), information spreading (Wu et al. 2004), structure visualizing (Wu and Li 
2011), and other applications. In recent years, community detection has received a 
great deal of attention as it has significance relating to online influence analysis, 
online marketing and ebusiness (Bagrow 2012; Papadopoulous et al. 2012; Li et al. 
2014b; Francesco and Clara 2014; Zhou and Lü 2014). 
However, community detection is not a straightforward task, because in real 
networks communities can be overlapped or hierarchical, and these features often 
occur simultaneously. The overlap of communities implies that vertices 
simultaneously belong to more than one group, for instance, people belong to 
different social groups, depending on their activities, interests,  etc. (Palla et al. 
2005). This breaks the assumption that a community should have more internal than 
external connections (because highly overlapping communities can have many more 
external than internal connections), and demands a method that is able to detect either 
overlapping or non-overlapping communities (Lancichinetti et al. 2009). The 
hierarchical form of communities implies that the communities are recursively 
grouped into a hierarchical structure, i.e. small communities can form larger ones, 
which in turn can group more communities together to form even larger ones, etc. In 
the presence of hierarchies, the concept of community structure becomes richer, and 
demands a method that is able to detect communities at different levels, not just 
within a single level (Lancichinetti et al. 2009). Another two essential challenges in 
community detection are the efficiency of algorithms and the prior knowledge on the 
number and size of communities, because the presence of many vertices and links in a 
large network results in heavy computation, and the number and size of communities 
are usually unknown beforehand. At present, these issues have not been solved 
satisfactorily. In existing community detection algorithms, some require a priori 
knowledge on the number and size of communities before performing the task of 
detecting communities, some are not able to detect overlapping and hierarchical 
communities, and some are not applicable to large-scale networks due to the low 
efficiency. 
Motivated by the need for developing an algorithm that can detect both 
overlapping and hierarchical communities without prior knowledge on the number 
and size of communities in large-scale networks, we develop an approach by applying 
cooperative game theory (Zlotkin and Rosenschein 1994) to detect communities in 
this study. Cooperative game theory (Zlotkin and Rosenschein 1994) studies the 
cooperative behaviours of groups of rational players, where players cooperate with 
each other for improving the group’s utility, such a group of players is called a 
coalition. One class of cooperative games is coalition formation games (Saad et al. 
2009), whose main objective is to analyse the formation of coalitional structures 
through players’ interaction. Coalition formation games are generally not 
superadditive due to the presence of costs that reduce the gains from forming the 
coalition. In social network environments, the behaviours of individuals are not 
independent (Zacharias et al. 2008), and joining a community provides one with 
tremendous benefits, such as members feeling rewarded in some ways for their 
participation in the community, and gaining honour and status for being members 
(Sarason 1974). In which case, every individual has an incentive to join communities; 
however, in real-world cases not only does each individual receive benefit(s) from the 
communities it belongs to, but the individual must also pay a certain price to maintain 
its membership within these communities (Chen et al. 2010). These characteristics 
make coalition formation game theory applicable to community detection. 
In this study, we first model the process of community detection as a coalition 
formation game, in which individuals in a social network are modelled as rational 
players aiming to achieve the maximal group’s utility by cooperating with other 
players to form coalitions. A coalition is a subset of players. Each player is allowed to 
join multiple coalitions, which reflects the concept of “overlapping communities”. 
Meanwhile, coalitions with fewer players can merge into a larger coalition as long as 
such merge operations could improve the utilities of the coalitions. This process 
reveals, in fact, the hierarchical structure of communities. A coalition is regarded as a 
stable community if it cannot further improve its utility by merging with other 
coalitions. If no coalition can further improve its utility by merging with other 
coalitions, the game achieves an equilibrium state of coalitions, and the configuration 
of communities at this state is called the stable community structure. 
Next, we introduce the utility function for each coalition, which is the 
combination of a gain function and a cost function. The gain function measures the 
degree of the interaction amongst the players inside a coalition, while the cost 
function represents the degree of the interaction between the players of that coalition 
and the rest of the network. Based on the defined utility function, two coalitions 
without any link between them cannot improve their utilities by merging into a larger 
coalition, thus whether a coalition is merged with others can be decided by looking 
only at its neighbours (coalitions that have at least one link between them), rather than 
necessitating the performance of an exhaustive search over the entire network. This 
can speed up the computation considerably. 
Then, we develop a greedy agglomerative manner to identify communities, 
which starts from the vertices as separate coalitions (singletons); coalitions are 
iteratively merged to improve the group’s utilities until no further merging of 
coalitions is needed. This greedy agglomerative manner does not require a priori 
knowledge on the number and size of the communities, and it matches the real-world 
scenario, in which communities are formed gradually from bottom to top.  
Finally, we conduct extensive experiments on different networks to assess the 
performance of our approach. Meanwhile, we also compare our results with other 
related studies. The experimental results show that our algorithm is effective and 
efficient in identifying overlapping and hierarchical communities.  
The main contributions of this study can be summarized as follows: 
 The coalition formation game theory is applied to address the community 
detection problem. This approach considers community formation as the result 
of the group behaviours of rational players who cooperate with each other to 
form coalitions for achieving and improving a group’s utilities. 
 A utility function for modelling the benefit and cost of each coalition is 
introduced, and the properties of the utility function, such as the non-resolution 
limit and the non-scaling behaviour, have been examined theoretically. 
 An algorithm based on the greedy agglomerative manner is proposed to identify 
communities. The proposed algorithm does not require a priori knowledge on 
the number and size of communities, and it can detect the overlapping and 
hierarchical communities simultaneously. 
 Extensive experiments on synthetic and real networks have been conducted to 
evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed approach. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces related work; 
Section 3 presents a coalition formation game theory-based framework for community 
detection; Section 4 provides a community detection algorithm that uses the greedy 
agglomerative manner to identify communities. The experimental results on the 
synthetic and real networks are presented in Section 5, and Section 6 concludes this 
paper. 
2 Related work 
A well-known method for detecting non-overlapping and non-hierarchical 
communities is the use of modularity-based methods (Newman and Girvan 2004), 
which is based on the idea that a random graph is not expected to have a cluster 
structure, so the possible existence of clusters is revealed by the comparison between 
the actual density of edges in a subgraph and the density one would expect to have in 
the subgraph, if the vertices of the graph were attached regardless of community 
structure (Fortunato 2010). However, modularity-based methods implicitly assume 
that communities do not intersect with one another, which is usually not the case for 
real-world communities (Chen et al. 2010). Fortunato and Barthélemy (2006) found 
that modularity optimization may fail to identify communities smaller than a scale 
which depends on the total number of links of the network and on the degree of 
interconnectedness of the communities, even in cases where communities are 
unambiguously defined. Brandes et al. (2008) also identified counterintuitive 
properties of modularity, such as non-locality and sensitivity to satellites.  
To detect overlapping communities, Palla et al. (2005) defined a 
k-clique-community as the union of all k-cliques that can be reached from each other 
through a series of adjacent k-cliques. But their algorithm requires the size of clique 
as an input, which is usually unknown in practical applications. Ahn et al. (2010) 
considered a community to be a set of closely interrelated links instead of a set of 
vertices with many links between them. Comparing with vertex communities, link 
communities incorporate overlap while revealing hierarchical organizations. In 
general, the number of links is greater than the number of vertices, so link-based 
approaches may suffer from greater computation cost than a vertex-based approach in 
the process of detecting communities. Ball et al. (2011) proposed a probabilistic 
model of link communities to detect communities, either overlapping or not, and used 
a fast, closed-form expectation- maximization algorithm to analyse networks of 
millions of vertices in reasonable running times. However, the approach of Ball et al. 
offers no criterion for determining the number of communities in a network. Galbrun 
et al. (2014) adapted efficient approximation algorithms to find k communities of 
labelled graphs so that the total edge density over all k communities is maximized and 
each community is succinctly described by a set of labels. To detect overlapping 
communities in semantic social networks, Xin et al. (2015a; 2015b) proposed 
methods, in which it is not necessary to pre-set the number of communities; Wu et al. 
(2015) provided an algorithm to solve the query biased densest connected subgraph 
(QDC) problem, where overlapping local communities and multiple disjointed local 
communities can also be found.  
Hierarchical clustering algorithms are usually used to reveal hierarchical 
communities of graphs. Sales-Pardo et al. (2007) proposed a top-down approach to 
identify the hierarchical communities of a graph from the similarity matrix of vertices, 
but the algorithm is not fast enough (Fortunato 2010). Clauset et al. (2008) used a 
dendrogram and a set of probabilities associated to the internal vertices of the 
dendrogram to describe the hierarchical organization of a graph. This method is 
capable of describing closely the graph properties, but it is impossible to rank 
community structures according to their relevance. Shen et al. (2009) handled the set 
of maximal cliques and adopted an agglomerative framework to detect both the 
overlapping and hierarchical properties of a complex community structure, but the 
efficiency of their algorithm requires improvement. Blondel et al. (2008) proposed a 
rapid method to unfold hierarchical community structures of large networks based on 
modularity optimization, but this method cannot detect overlapping communities. 
Game theories have been used to solve community detection problems. For 
example, Chen et al. (2010) addressed the community detection problem by a 
non-cooperative game theory-based framework (Nash 1951) that considers 
community formation as the result of individual agents’ rational behaviours and a 
community structure as an equilibrium of a game. This framework can identify 
overlapping communities because each agent is allowed to select multiple 
communities, but hierarchies between communities cannot be revealed. Alvari et al. 
(2011) considered the formation of communities in social networks as an iterative 
game in a multiagent environment, in which each vertex is regarded as an agent 
aiming to be in the communities with members such that they are structurally 
equivalent. Lung et al. (2012) formulated the community detection problem from a 
game theory point of view and solved this problem by using a crowding based 
differential evolution algorithm adapted for detecting Nash equilibria of 
non-cooperative games. Hajibagheri et al. (2012) used a framework based on an 
information diffusion model and Shapley Value concept to address the community 
detection problem. In Hajibagheri et al.’s framework, each vertex of the underlying 
graph is attributed to a rational agent aiming to maximize its Shapley value in the 
form of information it receives, and the Nash equilibrium of the game corresponds to 
the community structure of the graph. 
In our previous studies (Zhou et al. 2013a; 2013b), we proposed two coalitional 
game models for community detection. But the coalitional game theories used in 
(Zhou et al. 2013a, ; 2013b) are canonical coalitional games due to the characteristic 
functions defined in the models satisfying superadditive (Saad et al. 2009).  
 
In our previous studies (Zhou et al. 2013a; 2013b), we proposed two coalitional 
game models for community detection. But both characteristic functions defined in 
these models satisfy superadditive, thus players are willing to form grand coalitions 




Based on those characteristic functions, players are willing to form grand 
coalitions (the coalition of all players). In Zhou et al. (2015a), we combine 
cooperative and non-cooperative game theory to detect communities, while we 
propose a coalition formation game theory-based approach to detecting communities 
in multi-relational social networks, where multi-relational communities are defined as 
the shared communities over multiple single-relational graphs (Zhou et al. 2015b). 
Although the cooperative game is used in (Zhou et al. (2015a; 2015b), the forms of 
the utility function are different from the one designed in this paper. 
3 A coalition formation game theory-based framework for community detection 
One of the main characteristics that make a game a coalition formation game is the 
presence of a cost for forming coalitions. It makes coalition formation games 
generally not superadditive, which implies that forming a coalition brings gains to its 
members, but those gains are limited by a cost for forming the coalition, hence the 
grand coalition is seldom the optimal structure (Saad et al. 2009). In a coalition 
formation game, network structure and cost for cooperation play major roles. 
In this paper, we propose a coalition formation game theory-based framework to 
identify overlapping and hierarchical communities, thus individuals of a network 
choose to form community structures after a social network is formed. Individuals in a 
social network are modelled as rational players aiming to achieve and improve 
utilities of groups by cooperating with other players to form coalitions. Coalitions 
with fewer players can merge into a larger coalition as long as the merge operation 
can contribute to improve the utilities of the merged coalitions. The process of 
merging coalitions actually illustrates the process of forming the hierarchy 
communities. Meanwhile, each player is allowed to join multiple coalitions, which 
could capture and reflect the concept of “overlapping communities”. A community 
structure of a network is a collection of coalitions, and the number of coalitions in a 
collection of coalitions is the number of communities with respect to the community 
structure. Due to the hierarchical form amongst communities, there are different 
community structures at different levels. Amongst them, a stable community structure 
is an equilibrium state of coalitions, in which no group of players has an interest in 
performing a merge operation any further. 
The utility function for each coalition is defined as a combination (summation) 
of a gain function and a cost function. The gain function is based on a ratio of links 
inside a coalition over the total degree of vertices inside the same coalition, while the 
cost function is based on a ratio of the total degree of vertices inside a coalition over 
the total links in the network. The gain function measures the degree of the interaction 
amongst the players inside a coalition, while the cost function represents the degree of 
the interaction between the players of the coalition and the rest of the network. A 
coalition is regarded as a stable community if it cannot further improve its utility by 
merging with other coalitions. 
For a given social network, the objective of detecting communities is to detect 
and identify the overlapping and hierarchical communities of the network. For this 
objective, we first present the notations, definitions and properties of the utility 
function. 
3.1 Notations 
Let ),( EVG   be an undirected unweighted graph representing a social network 
with ||V  vertices (individuals) and || E  links (interactions). Let A  be an 
adjacency matrix of G  with 1xyA  if Eyx ),(  for any pair of vertices 
Vyx , and 0 otherwise, and let )(xd  be the degree of vertex x . 
Let S  denote a subset of V , which is called a coalition, meanwhile let )(Se , 
)(Sd  and )(Sv  be the number of links amongst vertices inside S , the total degree 
of vertices in S  and the utility function of S , respectively. For any coalition 
VSS 21, , let ),( 21 SSe  be the number of links connecting vertices of the coalition 
1S  to the vertices of the coalition 2S . Let ijS  be a super-coalition of iS  in a merge 
operation of iS . Furthermore, let Γ  be a community structure (a collection of 
coalitions), i.e. },...,,{ 21 kSSSΓ  , and let )(Γv  be the total utility achieved in Γ . 
Depending on the context, an element in V  may either be called a player or a 
vertex, and a subset of V  may either be called a group or a coalition or a community. 
Also, a collection of coalitions, a coalition structure and a community structure can be 
used interchangeably.  
 
Definition 1. Stable community. A coalition S  is regarded as a stable 
community if S  cannot further improve its utility by merging with other coalitions, 
i.e. SS  ' , )()'( SvSSv   and )'()(,' SvSvSS  . Specially, S  is called the 
grand coalition (Saad et al. 2009) if VS  , i.e., the coalition of all the players, while 
S  is called a trivial coalition if S  solely consists of a single vertex, i.e. 
VxxS  },{ . 
Definition 2. Utility increment of a coalition. The utility increment of coalition 
iS  with respect to ijS  is defined by )()(),( iijiji SvSvSSv  . 
Definition 3. Stable community structure. A collection of coalitions 






A stable community structure is a form of equilibrium state of coalitions, in 
which no group of players has an interest in performing a merge operation any further. 
When a game enters the equilibrium state, the number of coalitions in 
},...,,{ 21 kSSSΓ   is the number of communities, and the number of the vertices in 
kS  is the size of the community kS . 
Definition 4. Total Utility. Let },...,,{ 21 kSSSΓ  , then the total utility )(Γv  







SvΓv )()(                        (1). 
Theorem 1. The collection of coalitions },...,,{ 21 kSSSΓ   is a stable 
community structure if all kSSS ,...,, 21  are stable communities. 
Proof. From kSSS ,...,, 21  are stable communities, we have, for any ΓSi  , 




 holds.  
Theorem 2. A stable community structure },...,,{ 21 kSSSΓ   maximizes the 
total utility )(Γv . 
Proof. },...,,{ 21 kSSSΓ   is a stable community structure  kSSS ,...,, 21  are 




  )(Γv  is maximal. 
3.2 Utility function  
Definition 5. Utility function. Let S  be a coalition of ),( EVG  , then the 



















      (2) 
The first term and the second term in Equation (2) are called the gain function 
and the cost function of S , respectively. The gain function is the ratio of links inside 
S  over the total degree of the vertices in S ; the cost function instead represents the 
ratio of the total degree in that coalition over the total degree in the network. The 
larger gain function value means that there are more interactions amongst the players 
inside S , and the larger cost function value means that there is greater interaction 
between the players of the coalition S  and the rest of the network. Equation (1) 
means that forming a coalition brings gains to its members, but the gains are limited 
by a cost for forming the coalition.  
  is a scale factor used to adjust the cost of coalition S , ]1,0[ . 0  
means no cost for forming coalitions, i.e. forming a coalition is always beneficial. In 
this case, the utility function )(Sv  is superadditive due to it being defined only by 
the gain function. Thus, 1)( Vv , Vxxv  ,0})({ . That means that the utility 
function of the grand coalition has maximal value, while the utility function of a 
singleton coalition has a value of 0. When 1 , the costs for forming coalitions are 















. So, the grand coalition 
and the collection of trivial coalitions are seldom the optimal structures. Moreover, 
the smaller )(xd  is, the greater })({xv  will be. Which means that vertices with 
small degrees are apt to be far more interested in collaborating with other vertices to 
improve their utilities. 
  is another parameter used to adjust the context of the coalition S , ]1,0( . 
1  means that the context of coalitions is the whole network; 1  means that 
the context of coalitions is a local of the network. Complex networks normally 
include many vertices and links, so the cost of a coalition with fewer degrees may be 
neglected with respect to the whole network. By using  , the costs are localized. 
Example 1. Figure 1 shows two simple social networks. Figure 1(a) is a network 
with a 4-clique and Figure 1(b) is a network with two 3-cliques. In Figure 1(a), if 




















































































-1)4}32{1( ，，，v . So, the 4-clique can be 
assessed correctly. 
In Figure 1(b), if 0 , 1 , 1)4,5,6}32{1( ，，，v . The grand coalition has 



















































，v . The two 
3-cliques can be assessed correctly. The inequality )2,3}{1(})4,3,2,1({})4({ ，vvv   
means that players 1, 2 and 3 do not collaborate with player 4 although player 4 










Figure 1. Two simple social networks. (a). A 4-clique network; (b). A network with 
two 3-cliques 
 
3.3 Properties of the utility function 
The utility function )(Sv  of coalition S  defined in Equation (1) has the 
following properties. 
Property 1. Isolated vertices have no impact on )(Sv . 
This directly follows from the fact that )(Sv  depends on links and degrees, thus, 
an isolated vertex does not contribute, regardless of its association to a group. 
Therefore, all vertices are assumed to be of a degree greater than zero in this study, 
i.e., isolated vertices are excluded from further consideration. 

















Proof: When 0 , )(Sv  is superadditive, 1)()( max  VvSv ; when S  is a 
















Property 3. If S  is a clique, }){()( xSvSv  , Sx ; )(}){( SvySv   if 
3)( yd ; )(}){( SvySv   if 3)( yd . 
This property means that the utility of a clique is greater than the utility of each 
subset of the clique itself; the utility of a coalition composed of a clique and a vertex 
(that is not a member of the clique but is connected to a vertex of the clique) with 
degree 1 or 2 is greater than the utility of the clique, but the utility of the clique is 
greater than the utility of a coalition composed of the clique and a vertex (that is not a 
member of the clique but is connected to a vertex of the clique) with degree of at least 
3. 
Proof: Let S  be a p-clique ( 3p , because a 3-clique is a trivial clique), vertex 
Sx , pxd )( , Sy . The relationships between x  and y  are shown in Figure 
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Figure 2. A network with a p-clique S 
Property 4. )(Sv  is not limited by the resolution limit of Newman and 







































(Newman and Girvan 2004). 
The resolution limit of Newman and Girvan’s modularity means that modularity 
optimization may fail to identify communities smaller than a scale which depends on 
the total number of links of the network and on the degree of interconnectedness of 
the communities, even in cases where communities are unambiguously defined. For 
example, Figure 3 shows a network with four pairwise identical cliques (S3, S4 are two 
m-cliques and S1, S2 are two p-cliques, p < m); if m is large enough with respect to p 
(e.g. m = 20, p = 5), modularity optimization merges the two smallest groups into one 
(shown with a dotted line) (Fortunato and Barthélemy 2006). 
Proof: (1) Because 3)( yd , )(}){( 11 SvySv  (Property 3), )(Sv  can 
evaluate 1S  at lower level. 
(2) Because the utility function defined in Equation (1) is the combination of a 
gain function and a cost function, 1S  does not merge with 2S  at higher level if   
and   are suitable.  









Figure 3. A network with four pairwise identical cliques (S3, S4 are two m-cliques, S1, 
S2 are two p-cliques, p < m). 
Property 5. )(Sv  is not limited by the non-locality of Newman and Girvan’s  
modularity if S  is a clique. 
The non-locality of Newman and Girvan’s modularity means that the 
memberships of some vertices may be changed by adding an additional vertex, 
although locally their neighbourhood structure has not changed. For example, based 
on Newman and Girvan’s modularity, the vertices of the network shown in Figure 4 
(a) are clustered into two groups ({1,2,3,4}, {5,6}, represented by different shading), 
but the vertices are clustered into three groups ({1,2}, {3,7}, {4,5,6} in which the 
membership of vertex 4 is shifted after additional vertex 7 is connected to vertex 3 
(shown in Figure 4 (b)) (Brandes et al. 2008). 
Proof: Because S  is a clique and 1)( yd , thus )(}){( SvySv   (Property 
3), therefore, y  is just joined to S  rather than changing the membership of the 
vertex of S .  
For example, ({1,2,3,4}, {5,6}) is a stable community structure with respect to 
the vertices in Figure 4 (a), and ({1,2,3,4,7}, {5,6}) is a stable community structure 
after vertex 7 is connected to vertex 3 (shown in Figure 4 (c)). This shows that )(Sv  

















Figure 4. Non-locality behaviour. (a) The original community structure (based on 
Newman and Girvan’s modularity); (b) The community structure after vertex 7 is 
added (based on Newman and Girvan’s modularity); (c) The community structure 
after vertex 7 is added (based on v(S)) 
Property 6. )(Sv  is not sensitive to satellites. 
The sensitivity to satellites means that for a clique with leaves, a network of 2p 
vertices that consists of a p-clique and p-leaf vertices of 1 degree, such that each 
vertex of the clique is connected to exactly one leaf vertex, the optimal community 
structure based on Newman and Girvan’s modularity is composed of p groups, in 
which each group consists of a connected pair of a leaf and a clique vertex. Figure 5(a) 
shows an example (Brandes et al. 2008). 
Proof: According to Property 3, p-leaf vertices form the same coalition with 
vertices of the p-clique, i.e. the community formed by all vertices in the graph is a 
stable community.  
Thus, the stable community structure corresponding to the network of Figure 5(a) 











Figure 5. No sensitivity to satellites: (a) The community structure (based on Newman 
and Girvan’s modularity); (b) The community structure (based on v(S)) 
Property 7. )(Sv  does not have the scaling behaviour of Newman and Girvan’s 
modularity. 
The scaling behaviour of Newman and Girvan’s modularity means that by 
simply duplicating a network of 2p vertices that consists of a p-clique and p-leaf 
vertices of 1 degree such that each vertex of the clique is connected to exactly one leaf 
vertex, the optimal clustering is altered completely. For example, duplicating the 
network presented in Figure 5(a), three clusters in Figure 5(a) have been changed into 
two clusters, each of them being a network equivalent to the one in Figure 5(a) 
(shown in Figure 6) (Brandes et al. 2008).  
Proof: According to Property 6, the community formed by all vertices in a 
network, of 2p vertices that consists of a p-clique and p-leaf vertices of 1 degree such 
that each vertex of the clique is connected to exactly one leaf vertex, is a stable 
community formed by all vertices; in the same way, the community formed by all 
vertices in the duplicated graph is also a stable community. Therefore, )(Sv  does not 
have the scaling behaviour of Newman and Girvan’s modularity.  
For example, {1,2,3,4,5,6} is a stable community structure with respect to the 
vertices in Figure 5(a), and {{1,2,3,4,5,6}, {1’,2’,3’,4’,5’,6’}} is a stable community 
structure after the network presented in Figure 5(a) is duplicated based on )(Sv  
(shown in Figure 6). From Figure 6, we can see that the interactions amongst vertices 












Figure 6. Without scaling behaviour 
4 A community detection algorithm 
In this study, we develop a greedy agglomerative manner to identify 
communities, the main idea of the greedy agglomerative manner is to start from the 
vertices as separate coalitions (singletons); coalitions that can result the highest utility 
increment are iteratively merged into a larger coalition to improve the group’s utilities 
until no such merge operation can be performed. In this section, we first present the 
conditions of merging two coalitions, and then we give our greedy agglomerative 
algorithm, referred to as the COFOGA (coalition formation game-based greedy 
agglomerative) algorithm. 
4.1 The conditions of merging two coalitions 
Let 1S  and 2S  be two small coalitions with few players. 1S  and 2S  can 
merge into a larger coalition if and only if the following conditions are held. 
Condition 1: )()(&)()( 221121 SvSSvSvSSv  . This condition means 
that the utilities of 1S  and 2S  have been improved through the merge operation. 
The unilateral meet of two inequalities shows that two coalitions fail to reach an 
agreement to cooperate, for example, the case of “ )()( 121 SvSSv   but 
)()( 221 SvSSv  ” suggests that 2S  intends to cooperate with 1S  but 1S  may not 
agree. 
Note that there can be several pairs i  and j  such that )( ji SSv   is the 
maximum, meanwhile )()( iji SvSSv   and )()( jji SvSSv  . In these cases the 
algorithm selects an arbitrary pair to merge. 
Condition 1 ensures that a coalition formed by the merge operation has greater 
utility than that of its subsets.  
Condition 2: 0),( 21 SSe , i.e. 1S  does not cooperate with 2S  if 


















































































































)()( 121 SvSSv   and )()( 221 SvSSv   cannot be greater than zero at the same 
time, because if 0)()( 121  SvSSv , then )()()()( 2112 SdSeSdSe   is inevitable, but 
under this condition, 0)()( 221  SvSSv . Therefore, if 0),( 21 SSe , 1S  does not 
cooperate with 2S . This implies that two coalitions without a link between them 
cannot merge into a larger coalition. Based on this conclusion, whether a coalition is 
merged with others can be decided by looking only at its neighbours (coalitions that 
have links between them), without an exhaustive search over the entire network. 
Condition 3: ||2)( 21 ESSe  . The study of Fortunato and Barthélemy 
(2006) shows that a coalition S  (with )(Se  internal links) found by modularity 
optimization may be a combination of two or more smaller communities if 
||2)( ESe  . Here, we use ||2)( 21 ESSe   as one of the conditions for 
merging two coalitions. 
4.2 Description of the coalition formation game-based greedy agglomerative algorithm 
The pseudo-code for the greedy agglomerative algorithm is given in the COFOGA 
algorithm. 
COFOGA algorithm: 
Input: A network G(V, E)  
Output: The communities of the network 
Variables: 
k : The index of level in the hierarchical communities of the graph 
kCoaSet : The set of coalitions at k-th level 
CooSetMap : The map of kCoaSet , i.e. the copy of kCoaSet  
CooSps : A cooperative sponsor, i.e. a coalition with maximal utility in kCoaSet   
CooCaSet : The set of cooperative candidates, i.e. a cooperative candidate is a 
coalition in which there is at least one link between the coalition and CooSps   
*CooCas : A best cooperative candidate, i.e. such a coalition in CooCaSet that the 
cooperation of the coalition with CooSps  can bring about the maximal increment of 
utility. 
Steps: 
1. 0k  
2. }}{},...,2{},1{{ VCoaSet k    
3. Do 
4.    kCoaSetCoaSetMap   
5.    1 kk  
6.    kCoaSet  
7.    while CoaSetMap  
8.        )(maxarg SvCooSps
CoaSetMapS
   
9.        }{CooSpsCoaSetMapCoaSetMap   
10.        },,,0),(|{)( 1 kCoaSetSSyCooSpsxyxASCooSpsCooCaSet  
11.       while )(CooSpsCooCaSet  







13.           if ||2)( * ECooCasCooSpse   & 
)()( * CooSpsvCooCasCooSpsv   & )()( ** CooCasvCooCasCooSpsv     
14.               *CooCasCooSpsCooSps    
15.                }{ *CooCasCoaSetMapCoaSetMap    









17.           else }{)()( *CooCasCooSpsCoaCaSetCooSpsCoaCaSet   
18.           end if 
19.       end while 
20.   }{CooSpsCoaSetCoaSet kk   
21.   end while 
22. while 1 kk CoaSetCoaSet  
23. for 0i  to k  
24.    Output kCoaSet   
25. end for 
 
Step 1~Step 2 are the initializations: each vertex forms a singleton coalition, and 
all singleton coalitions form 0CoaSet ; the loop of Step 11~Step 19 creates a coalition 
for 1kCoaSet , while the loop of Step 7~Step 21 creates all coalitions for 1kCoaSet ; 
the loop of Step 3~Step 22 reveals the hierarchical communities of the graph, and the 
loop of Step 23~Step 25 outputs community structures at different levels. For creating 
coalitions for 1kCoaSet , Step 8 selects CooSps  from kCoaSetMap , Step 9 deletes 
CooSps  from kCoaSetMap , Step 10 selects cooperative candidates for CooSps  from 
1kCoaSet , and Step 12 finds the best cooperative candidate *CooCas ; if CooSps  and 
*CooCas  meet conditions for merging, then merge operation can be carried out and 
CooSps  is replaced by the coalition formed by merging CooSps  and *CooCas  in 
Step 14; Step 15 deletes *CooCas  from kCoaSetMap ; Step 16 amends 
)(CooSpsCooCaSet  by deleting *CooCas  and adding cooperative candidates of 
*CooCas  ( CooSps  excepted). This process is repeated until no further merge 
operations can be performed.  
CooSps  can only be selected from kCoaSetMap , while cooperative candidates of 
CooSps  are selected from 1kCoaSet . This strategy enables that  CooSps  is not 
selected for multiple times and each vertex can join multiple coalitions. 
0CoaSet ， 1CoaSet ，…, kCoaSet  reveal the hierarchical communities of the graph. 
The value of k  represents the number of levels, kCoaSet  implies the community 
structure at k-th level, and the number of coalitions in kCoaSet  means the number of 
communities at k-th level. Because the agglomerative process is carried out 
automatically, the number and size of the communities are obtained automatically 
rather than specified in advance.   
The time complexity of the COFOGA algorithm is |)|log|(| VVO  at worst case. 
Note that, 1|| V  iterations are an upper bound and the algorithm will terminate as 
soon as a pair of coalitions would not be merged. It is possible that the algorithm ends 
before the grand coalition forms.  
5 Experiments and results 
In this section, extensive experiments have been undertaken for assessment: 
(1) the effectiveness of the COFOGA algorithm in real networks. Two 
well-known real networks are used to examine if the COFOGA algorithm can 
correctly identify the overlapping communities and the hierarchical structure of 
communities;   
(2) the effectiveness of the COFOGA algorithm in benchmark networks. These 
benchmark networks are produced under different assumptions containing different 
community information, such as different vertices, different connections, or different 
overlapping vertices. Because the real community information is known, we use the 
normalized mutual information (NMI) as the quantitative evaluation metric. These 
benchmark networks are also used to assess the efficiency of the COFOGA algorithm 
under different conditions. 
(3) whether the COFOGA algorithm is limited by the resolution limit. To this 
end, we create two synthetic networks made of cliques (complete graphs). We want to 
find out whether the COFOGA algorithm can integrate the smaller cliques into the 
larger group.  
(4) comparisons have been made with other algorithms in which non-cooperative 
game theory has been applied.   
5.1 Assessing the effectiveness of the COFOGA algorithm in real networks 
We first apply the COFOGA algorithm in the Zachary’s Karate Network 
(Zachary 1977) and the Lusseau's Dolphin Network (Lusseau 2003), two well-known 
real networks used to test community detection algorithms. The Zachary’s Karate 
Network consists of 34 vertices and 79 links, and the Lusseau's Dolphin Network 
consists of 62 vertices and 159 links. Figure 7 (a) and (b) presents the communities 
detected by LocalEquilibrium (an algorithm that applies non-cooperative game theory) 
(Chen et al. 2010) and coalitions detected by the COFOGA at the first level (i.e. 1k ) 
in the Zachary’s Karate Network, and Figure 8 (a) and (b) presents the communities 
detected by LocalEquilibrium (Chen et al. 2010) and coalitions detected by the 
COFOGA at the first level (i.e. 1k ) in the Lusseau's Dolphin Network. Similar to the 
community structures detected by LocalEquilibrium, the community structures 
detected by COFOGA are refinements of the community structures discovered in 
Newman and Girvan’s work (2004), in which two networks are divided into two 
components (the two components in the Zachary’s Karate Network correspond to the 
upper overlapping communities and the two lower communities in Figure 7(b), and 
the two components in the Lusseau's Dolphin Network correspond to the three upper 
overlapping communities and the three lower communities in Figure 8(b)). However, 
the number of communities and the overlapping vertices discovered by the COFOGA 
are different from those discovered by LocalEquilibrium, for example, in the 
Zachary’s Karate Network, LocalEquilibrium discovered five communities and three 
overlapping vertices (vertices 1, 33 and 34), while the COFOGA discovers three 
communities and only one overlapping vertex (vertex 10, which has two links 
connecting to vertices in different communities). In addition, there may be more than 
one overlapping vertex between two communities in the structure detected by the 
COFOGA, (e.g. vertices 22, 3, 21 and 51 in the Lusseau's Dolphin Network).  
Figure 9 shows the stable community structures of the Zachary’s Karate 
Network and the Lusseau's Dolphin Network detected by the COFOGA. These stable 
community structures are similar to the community structures discovered in Newman 
and Girvan’s work (2004). 
This experiment indicates that the COFOGA algorithm is able to discover 
overlapping and hierarchical communities, which by visual inspection provide 
meaningful information about the community structures and can be used in further 





Figure 7. The community structures for the Zachary’s karate Network. (a) The 
structure detected by LocalEquilibrium (Chen et al. 2010); (b) The structure detected 





Figure 8. The community structures of the Lusseau's Dolphin Network. (a). The 
structure detected by LocalEquilibrium (Chen et al. 2010); (b). The structure 




Figure 9. The stable community structures of the Zachary’s Karate Network and the 
Lusseau's Dolphin Network detected by COFOGA. (a). The stable community 
structure of the Zachary’s Karate Network (CoaSet2, 25.0 , 1 ); (b). The 
stable community structure of the Lusseau's Dolphin Network (CoaSet2, 25.0 , 
1 ) 
5.2 Assessing the effectiveness and efficiency of the COFOGA algorithm in 
benchmark networks 
We first produce a benchmark network with overlapping vertices by using 
Lancichinetti and Fortunato’s method (2009) under following parameters: the number 
of vertices N =128, the average degree k=10, the maximum degree maxk=30, the 
mixing parameter, i.e. the portion of crossing edges mu=0.1, the minus exponent for 
the degree sequence t1=2, the minus exponent for the community size distribution 
t2=1, the minimum for the community sizes minc=10, the maximum for the 
community sizes maxc=30, the number of overlapping vertices on=10, the number of 
memberships of the overlapping vertices om=2. The benchmark structure and 
community structures detected by LocalEquilibrium and COFOGA are shown in 
Figure 10 and Table 1. In Table 1, the shaded vertices are overlapping vertices.  
 
    
Figure 10. The community structures of the benchmark network with 128 vertices. (a) 
The benchmark network; (b) The community structure detected by LocalEquilibrium; 
(c) The stable community structure detected by the COFOGA ( 1366/1  at the first 
level, 25.0  at the higher level, 1.0 ). 
 
No. Benchmark  stra-game coop-game 
1 1 11 14 21 22 25 26 47 63 66 69 
73 74 84 88 99 104 109 111 
1 11 14 21 22 25 26 47 63 66 69 
73 74 84 88 99 104 109 111 
1 11 14 21 22 25 26 47 63 66 69 
73 74 84 88 99 104 109 111  
2 2 3 17 23 31 39 41 50 52 82 86 
90 100 107 128 
2 3 17 23 31 39 41 50 52 82 86 
90 100 105 107 128 
2 3 17 23 31 39 41 50 52 82 86 
90 100 105 107 128  
3 4 33 35 40 43 44 48 56 59 61 75 
80 91 95 96 98 110 115 116 118  
4 33 35 40 43 44 48 56 59 61 75 
80 91 95 96 98 110 115 116 118 
4 33 35 40 43 44 48 56 59 61 75 
80 91 95 96 98 110 115 116 118  
4 6 9 19 24 32 38 42 45 46 59 64 
83 89 102  
6 9 19 24 32 38 42 45 46 59 64 
83 89 102 
6 9 19 24 32 38 42 45 46 59 64 
83 89 102  
5 5 15 16 37 41 51 54 57 58 70 79 
87 92 94 101 106 114 
5 15 16 37 41 51 54 57 58 70 79 
87 92 94 101 106 114 
5 15 16 37 41 51 54 57 58 70 79 
87 92 94 101 106 114  
6 8 10 12 18 29 34 51 53 55 56 62 
65 71 72 78 81 87 90 103 105 
114 119 121 122 125 126 127 
128  
8 10 12 18 29 34 51 53 55 56 62 
65 71 72 78 81 87 103 105 114 
119 121 122 125 126 127 128 
8 10 12 18 29 34 51 53 55 56 62 
65 71 72 78 81 87 90 103 105 
114 119 121 122 125 126 127 
128 
7 7 13 20 27 28 30 36 49 60 67 68 
76 77 85 93 97 108 111 112 113 
117 120 122 123 124  
7 13 20 27 28 30 36 49 60 67 68 
76 77 85 93 97 108 111 112 113 
117 120 122 123 124 
7 13 20 27 28 30 36 49 60 67 68 
76 77 85 93 97 108 111 112 113 
117 120 122 123 124  
 
Table 1 The structures of benchmark network and the communities detected by LocalEquilibrium and 
COFOGA (The vertices with shade are overlapping vertices) 
 
From Table 1, we can see that both LocalEquilibrium and COFOGA identify the 
number of communities and the memberships of vertices (except for vertex 150 and 
90) correctly. Vertex 150 is not an overlapping vertex in the benchmark structure, but 
both LocalEquilibrium and the COFOGA judge that vertex 105 is an overlapping 
vertex. From Figure 10, we can see that vertex 105 has many links connected to 
different groups, so the judgment of LocalEquilibrium and the COFOGA is 
reasonable. Vertex 90 is an overlapping vertex in the benchmark structure and the 
COFOGA identifies it correctly, but LocalEquilibrium does not identify it as an 
overlapping vertex. From Figure 10, we can see that vertex 90 has also many links 
connected to different groups, so it is an overlapping vertex. 
Next we produce a series of benchmark networks with overlapping vertices 
under different parameters and use the normalized mutual information (NMI) (Danon 
et al. 2005; Lancichinetti et al. 2009) between the detected community structure and 
the underlying ground truth as the evaluation metric (Lancichinetti et al. 2009). Figure 
11 presents the NMI values between the community structures detected by 
LocalEquilibrium/COFOGA and the benchmark community structures under different 
fractions of overlapping vertices. Figure 12 compares the running times of 
LocalEquilibrium and COFOGA for detecting community structures on the produced 
benchmark networks. The x-axis represents the portion of vertices that belong to 
multiple communities. Figure 13 presents the NMI values between the community 
structures detected by the COFOGA and the benchmark community structures under 
different  . The x-axis represents the value of  . The networks used to produce 
Figures 11, 12 and 13 (a)~(d) consist of 1,000 vertices, whereas those of Figure 11, 12 
and 13 (e)~(h) consist of 5,000 vertices. The community sizes in Figure 11, 12 and 13 
(a), (b), (e) and (f) range between minc=10 and maxc=50, and the community sizes in 
Figure 11, 12 and 13 (c), (d), (g) and (h) range between minc=20 and maxc=100. The 
mixing parameter mu=0.1 for Figures 11, 12 and 13 (a), (c), (e) and (g), and mu=0.3 
for Figures 11, 12 and 13 (b), (d), (f) and (h). The other parameters are t1=2, t2=1, 
k=20, maxk=50 and om=2.  
From Figure 11, we can see that both the COFOGA and LocalEquilibrium 
perform very well when the portion of crossing edges mu=0.1, with NMI being above 
85 per cent, and the COFOGA outperforms LocalEquilibrium when the portion of 
overlapping vertices is small. For mu=0.3, the COFOGA outperforms 
LocalEquilibrium no matter the number of vertices N=1,000 or N=5,000. 
From Figure 12, we can see that the COFOGA is much faster than 
LocalEquilibrium over all instances: the longest running time of the COFOGA is 11 
and 67 seconds for N=1,000 and N=5,000 respectively, while the shortest running 
time of LocalEquilibrium is 185 and 203 seconds for N=1,000 and N=5,000 
respectively. Moreover, the running time of LocalEquilibrium increases greatly with 
the number of vertices N, the portion of crossing edges mu, and the fraction of 
overlapping vertices, for example, the running time of LocalEquilibrium is 4,495 
seconds for N=5,000, mu=0.3 and where half the vertices belong to multiple 
communities. However, the running time of the COFOGA is more stable than 
LocalEquilibrium. 
From Figure 13, we can see that different   result in different NMI for each 
network. The values of   corresponding to the maximal NMI in different networks 
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(b) 01.0  
(c) 01.0  (d) 01.0  









(f) 001.0  
(g) 001.0  (h) 01.0  
(e) 001.0  
Figure 11. The NMI values between the community structures detected by 
LocalEquilibrium/COFOGA and the real community structures under different 
fractions of overlapping vertices, (a)~(d) consist of 1,000 vertices, (e)~(h) consist of 
5,000 vertices. The minimum degree and maximum degree of the network are 20 and 










































































































(d) 01.0  
(b) 01.0  (a) 01.0  
















(h) 01.0  
(f) 001.0  (e) 001.0  
(g) 001.0  
 
Figure 12. The running times of LocalEquilibrium and COFOGA for detecting 
community structures on the benchmark networks under different fractions of 
overlapping vertices, (a)~(d) consist of 1,000 vertices, (e)~(h) consist of 5,000 
vertices. The minimum degree and maximum degree of the network are 20 and 50 
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mu=0.1 
 Figure 13. The NMI values between the community structures detected by the 
COFOGA and the real community structures under different  , (a)~(d) consist of 
1,000 vertices, (e)~(h) consist of 5,000 vertices. The minimum degree and maximum 
degree of the network are 20 and 50 respectively. The fraction of overlapping vertices 
is 0.5. ||/1 E  at the first lever and 25.0  at the other levels. 
The experimental results on the benchmark networks indicate that the COFOGA 
algorithm achieves results of high quality in terms of the NMI measures, and is much 
faster than the LocalEquilibrium algorithm.  
 
5.3 Assessing the resolution limit 
The first synthetic network (SNC1) is made of 30 identical cliques, which are 
complete graphs with five vertices connected by single links. The community 
structure of SNC1 detected by LocalEquilibrium is shown in Figure 14 (a). Figure 14 
(b) shows the community structures of SNC1 detected by COFOGA at the first level, 
in which different colours represent different communities, and vertices with the same 
colour belong to the same community.  
The second synthetic network (SNC2) is made of four cliques. Two of which are 
complete graphs with 30 vertices, and the other two are complete graphs with 5 
vertices. The community structure of SNC2 detected by LocalEquilibrium is shown in 
Figure 15 (a), Figure 15 (b) shows the community structure of SNC2 detected by 
COFOGA at the first level, in which different grey levels represent different 
communities, and vertices with the same grey level belong to the same community. 
 
   
Figure 14. The community structures of SNC1. (a). The community structure of 
SNC1 detected by LocalEquilibrium; (b). The community structure of SNC1 detected 
by the COFOGA at the first level (CoaSet1, 330/1  , 1.0 ). 
 
 
Figure 15. The community structures of SNC2 .(a). The community structure of 
SNC2 detected by LocalEquilibrium, The community structure of SNC2 detected by 
the COFOGA at the first level (CoaSet1, 1784/1  , 3.0 ). 
Figures 14 and 15 indicate that both LocalEquilibrium and the COFOGA identify 
community structures correctly, i.e. both of them are not limited by the resolution 
limit of Newman and Girvan’s modularity.  
6 Conclusions 
In this paper, community detection in a social network is modelled as a coalition 
formation game in which individuals cooperate with each other to improve a group’s 
utilities. This matches well with the fact that a community in fact is an interactive 
phenomenon amongst multiple individuals, thus the proposed approach in this paper 
is able to detect communities more rationally, where overlapping and hierarchical 
communities can be identified. Because the number of coalitions is fewer than the 
number of individuals, the game amongst coalitions would require less computation 
than the game amongst all individuals, thus our approach, which is based on the 
coalition formation game, is more efficient than the approaches that are based on 
non-cooperative game theory. Meanwhile, our approach avoids the pre-requests for 
the number and the size of communities. In addition to discovering groups of related 
individuals in social networks, our approach can also be applied to other purposes, 
such as to detect sets of web pages dealing with the same topic, or biochemical 
pathways in metabolic networks. 
In this study, we detect the community structure that maximizes the total utility 
by the coalition formation process in this paper, but we do not consider the evolution 
of this structure, i.e. the change of the community structure when one or more players 
joins or leaves the game. 
In our utility function,   and   are two important parameters. In this study, 
we let ||/1 E  at the first level, and let 25.0  at the other levels. So our 
experimental results are only influenced by  . The experiment results show that 
community structures detected by the COFOGA are sensitive to  . As part of our 
future work, we consider the design of a method to find appropriate   and   
automatically, or to design a more appropriate utility function. 
In the future, we will further explore the properties of the coalition formation 
game, especially of the utility function, for tracing the evolution of the community 
structure and reducing the centralized complexity, and we will make efforts to reduce 
the computational complexity and investigate the distributed approach for forming 
coalitions, which has a distinct advantage for dealing with large scale networks.  
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